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A Grand Exercise In Forgiveness, Or Justice
Held Hostage To Truth? South Africa’S
Truth And Reconciliation Commission
Judging the Judges, Judging Ourselves: Truth, Reconciliation and the Apartheid
Legal Order by David Dyzenhaus
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998) pages i–xviii, 1–206. Price £22.50 (hardcover). ISBN
1 901362 94 9.
What kind of world was this? In the existential belly of white supremacy, ordinary human
relations were suppressed or distorted. The normal likes and dislikes of people for one another
were controlled by the state and disfigured by white supremacist culture; the whole ugly process
was hidden behind the soothing euphemisms of apartheid, or separate freedoms. It was a world
that was upside-down.[1]
This vivid description of one of the 20th century’s most shameful epochs, the ‘upside-down’
nature of this world, indicates why South Africans appreciated that the shift from a society
premised on apartheid to one characterised by democratic notions was never going to be easy.
Both in the formal arrangement negotiated to transform the society and thereby produce the new
Constitution,[2] as well as in the myriad of informal interactions occurring daily, urgency and
compromise loomed large. In other words, between February 1990 (the date President Mandela
was released from prison) and May 1994 (the date of the first election) South Africans were
immersed in the business of planning and shaping the new democratic order. These few years
were also a particularly violent period.[3]
The constitutional arrangement agreed to has generally been hailed as one of the century’s most
impressive.[4] The Bill of Rights is expansive in its coverage of a plethora of protected
individuals and groups, its generous definition of equality and the impressive list of bodies
mandated to enforce the rights enumerated.[5] The Constitution is a model of compromise: it
incorporates and embraces the demands of various lobbying groups who wanted to ensure that
their needs and interests were accommodated in the final document.
Although the drafters of the Constitution ensured that it embraced the vision of the new South
Africa, they realised they had to confront the human rights abuses typified by apartheid which
had left an indelible mark on the society, and which had spawned numerous victims. It was
generally believed that the transition to democracy and stability could only be achieved if the
unfinished business of apartheid was dealt with. In short, the task was to face the monster of
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apartheid (represented by an unaccountable security force) and eliminate its destructive potential
forever.
The instrument which was agreed to as the best means of accomplishing this task was the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (‘TRC’). The TRC was set up to advance the goals of
reconciliation and reconstruction in South Africa, furthering the imperatives set out in the first
post-apartheid Constitution.[6] The architects of the TRC saw that its purpose would not be
merely to make reparations to victims, but would also be to lead to institutional reform. They
saw that its role would be to contribute to the values of the institutions of the new democratic
order. The TRC was seen as one of the foundational institutions in South Africa (some would
argue the main institution) to bridge
the past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and
injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful coexistence and development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race,
class, belief or sex.[7]
Most significantly, the TRC articulated its purpose as being to explore the relationship between
truth and justice.
The TRC represents an impressive model of political compromise, its existence seen as crucial to
the new democratic order. The TRC has been viewed as having the potential to make a uniquely
important contribution to democratisation and development in South Africa, that is, helping to
strengthen the (moral) basis of an emerging democracy.
South Africa’s TRC drew much on other models of truth commissions, especially those from
Latin American countries,[8] but settled in favour of a more extensive mandate. For example, the
South African Parliament rejected the notion of blanket amnesty in favour of individual amnesty
on application so that the truth could be excavated unconditionally. What is particularly unique
about the South African model, however, is that its parliamentary mandate included not only an
investigation into the gross violation of human rights, that is, a thorough investigation of the
deaths and disappearances of activists, but also an interrogation of the organisations and
institutions of civil society that advanced the cause of apartheid, or benefited in some way from
it. The media, medical establishment, legal profession, churches and the business community all
fell within the ambit of the TRC as it pursued its mandate. The TRC focused not only on the dark
deeds of individual perpetrators, but also on highlighting the responsibility of various institutions
for injustices in the form of gross human rights violations, which had resulted from their acts of
commission and omission. Chains of command were investigated, submissions were requested
from groupings, and hearings and investigations were accompanied by a consultative process of
preparing detailed recommendations to prevent violations in the future.[9]
Another significant feature of the TRC in South Africa was its mandate to investigate all sources
of human rights violations. This was in recognition of the uncomfortable fact that the
perpetrators of human rights violations did not just emanate from one origin, but included
members of the police and security forces serving the National Party (the official party of
apartheid) as well as members of Umkhonto We Sizwe, the liberation army of the African
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National Congress (‘ANC’), the Azanian People’s Liberation Army and the Inkatha Freedom
Party. The issue of moral parity, that is, between those imposing apartheid and those fighting it,
has generated some debate.[10]
The TRC was divided into three committees. The Committee on Human Rights Violations was
entrusted with the task of designating victim status to individuals as articulated in the enabling
statute, for the purposes of reparations and rehabilitation. The Committee for Amnesty was
empowered to grant amnesty to individual perpetrators after ‘full disclosure of all relevant facts’
for acts associated with political objectives,[11] thereby shielding such perpetrators from
criminal and civil liability. The question of amnesty generated some opposition from the families
of victims, culminating in an unsuccessful court challenge to the constitutionality of the
TRC.[12] The Committee on Reparations had the task of submitting a report to the South African
Government to inform the latter’s approach to reparations and rehabilitation of victims.
The notion of who is a ‘victim’ of apartheid is a complicated one, since arguably everybody who
was subjected to its deleterious impact suffered. In other words, the ‘ordinary’ victims of
apartheid, those individuals denied education, housing, jobs and other basic needs because of
their race, are victims of apartheid, and arguably ought to be compensated in some way.[13]
However, the process of the TRC, and its targeting of victims of gross violations of human
rights, set apart the extraordinary victims of apartheid. This is overall a good thing, because not
every black person[14] could certainly be compensated. Recognising gross violations of human
rights under apartheid does not absolve the horror of its banality. By unmasking the horror of the
excesses of the security apparatus, the ordinary system of apartheid, which buttressed white
privilege, was implicated in this horror.
The proceedings of the TRC, and the way they unfolded between blacks and whites in South
Africa, were in some ways inevitable. Many blacks felt vindicated that their prior knowledge of
the excesses of the security establishment was now confirmed and had become part of official
history. Most whites, on the other hand, witnessed the proceedings with sentiments ranging from
indifference to outrage, the latter motivated by what they perceived as the ANC bias of the TRC,
or a witch-hunt of Afrikaners.[15]
The choice of chairperson of the TRC, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, South Africa’s second Nobel
Laureate, infused a particularly evangelical, overwhelmingly Christian sentiment into the TRC’s
proceedings, and injected a particular model of reconciliation. Rituals of prayer, to commence
the proceedings, or to intersperse awkward and troubling moments, became a staple.[16] Despite
this, however, certain commentators believed the TRC to be more ‘a source of division than of
unity’.[17] From April 1996, when the TRC commenced its proceedings, until mid-1998, when
the public hearings ceased, South Africans were transfixed at their radios and television sets as
victims recalled dastardly tales of torture, disappearances and deaths, and the perpetrators
attempted to disclose all. For a new democracy it was a tricky venture, one which could generate
not ideas of reconciliation and forgiveness, but resentment and revenge.
In its endeavours, key questions had to be addressed by the TRC: What does reconciliation
mean? Who should be reconciled? Who benefits from reconciliation? What are the benefits of

reconciliation? The TRC was born out of an enormous sense of hope, but there was always the
fear that it would degenerate into a quagmire of scepticism and cynicism.
An evaluation of the success or otherwise of the TRC may seem premature, but there have been
some interesting reflections thus far. One such work is David Dyzenhaus’ book, Judging the
Judges, Judging Ourselves: Truth, Reconciliation and the Apartheid Legal Order.[18] The book
is a narrative and critique of the legal hearings which took place over three days at the TRC.
These hearings were the official inquiry into the legal order during the apartheid era and into
those who sustained the system, in other words, those who made it possible and workable, and
gave it credibility.[19]
The purpose of the legal hearings differed somewhat from those of the individual victim and
perpetrator inquiries. The former were to serve as an inquiry into the legal system, without
recourse to confrontation and condemnation. Dyzenhaus doubts whether they succeeded,
claiming that ‘[t]he atmosphere at the Hearing was more often than not confrontational and
accusatory, more like a trial than an inquiry.’[20] Judges were berated not just for dereliction of
their legal and moral duties under apartheid, but also for failing to appear before the TRC to
provide a comprehensive account.[21]
The legal hearings were arguably the most crucial of the institutional hearings. After all, it was
the processes of law which kept apartheid in place. It was the formal legal edifice, one not too
distinct from its European counterparts, which gave apartheid its respectable face.[22] The
apartheid government, unlike its counterparts in Central America during the 1980s,[23] was
spared the necessity of relying on death squads and bands of paramilitaries to terrorise citizens
into submission. Law regulated every aspect of people’s lives, for example, where they could
live, where they could go to school, whom they could marry.[24] It was a tightly woven
institutional structure with its mandates and penalties, spectacular in its detail, and over most of
the period of apartheid, administered without much public protest.[25]
The trappings of legality performed an important symbolic role for the minority white South
African Government, allowing them the delusion that they were part of the Western democratic
world. It also allowed the beneficiaries of apartheid, that is, white South Africans (as opposed to
the perpetrators of gross human rights abuses), the benefit of reassuring themselves that they
were living in a civilised state, regulated by law.[26]
Dyzenhaus sets out to describe the hearings as they took place, as well as to analyse their
purpose and success. He outlines the positions taken by the main protagonists in the legal
system — the judges, magistrates, lawyers, academics and public servants — and then sets out to
analyse their roles during the apartheid era, and the substance of their submissions. The major
focus of this study, as the book title suggests, is the role that judges played during the apartheid
era and, by implication, their position within the new democratic order. In this endeavour he
musters an impressive array of jurisprudential sources, and of course draws on his previous
work.[27] The author also expands on his own submission to the TRC, coincidentally, the first to
be made at the legal hearing.

The author situates himself within the South African context as a white male who was
conscripted to serve, and did serve, in the apartheid army, and is now an expatriate in Canada.
He is a highly respected legal scholar who has written extensively on South African legal issues.
From this vantage point he sets out to examine the legal hearings, and what light they bear on the
past, the present and the future.
Dyzenhaus details a rather pathetic legacy on the part of the major actors in the legal system.
From the members of the various bars, to the civil servants and academics, who all participated
in this system of gross racial injustice, he illustrates a range of reactions from indifference and
cowardice through to zealous promotion of the values of the Government. There is no doubt that
despite the voices of some individuals in the profession, the professional associations of
advocates and attorneys share a shameful history,[28] and Dyzenhaus chronicles this in some
detail. His task is hampered somewhat by the paucity of submissions from the law schools and
public servants, and by the guarded responses of the professional bodies representing attorneys
and advocates.[29]
At the outset the author places himself at odds with one of South Africa’s most eminent jurists,
the President of the Constitutional Court, Arthur Chaskalson, who was also one of the most
prominent anti-apartheid lawyers in the country. He refers to a speech made by Judge
Chaskalson in 1989,[30] in which the latter referred to the possibilities of the application of the
rule of law in a society characterised by fundamental legal inequality and burdened by the
constraints of parliamentary sovereignty. In that speech Judge Chaskalson had referred to an
‘almost schizophrenic approach’ by the courts which were required to ‘give effect to equitable
common law principles’ while at the same time upholding and enforcing ‘discriminatory
laws’.[31] Judge Chaskalson was of the view that judges were under a duty to resort to common
law presumptions (of equality and liberty) when statutes were sufficiently ambiguous.[32] His
position was premised on the Roman–Dutch and British common law principles on which South
Africa’s legal system was based.
Dyzenhaus differs from certain presumptions that Judge Chaskalson makes. He points to the
immutable problem associated with parliamentary supremacy, namely, that statutory law always
overrides the common law. The South African Parliament was therefore able either carefully to
avoid common law presumptions, or to enact further legislation. He also disputes Judge
Chaskalson’s assumption that judges were under a duty to interpret the law in accordance with
common law principles of equality and liberty. Dyzenhaus opines that the majority of South
African judges adhered to the ‘plain fact approach’,[33] an interpretive methodology which
seeks to give effect to the intention of the legislature, irrespective of common law principles or
of the proclivities of individual judges. Dyzenhaus elicits significant examples which
demonstrate the pattern.[34]
In their submissions, the liberal judges encapsulated their arguments as follows: there is no doubt
that the judges lent credibility to this evil legal system, but their roles were crucial even though
more often than not they paid lip service to the common law ideals of liberty and equality. They
kept alive the idea of law and justice for people who very often had little else to turn to; that as
limited and constrained as that possibility was, some victories may still have been possible. So
for example, when trade unions started to organise and agitate for workers’ rights and changes to

the patently oppressive labour laws and policies, the courts were essential in advancing the cause
of workers.[35] So too public interest lawyers, commencing in the late 1970s, began to challenge
the most egregious aspects of apartheid in the courts. As apartheid’s arrogance and confidence
began to be challenged and began to wane, and as popular uprising loomed large, the courts
became a significant site of political struggle. Victories were not always obtained, but they
provided the possibility for vindication of rights.[36]
In the submissions of the liberal judges, it was also argued that the process of challenging state
action in the courts had significant beneficial outcomes, two of which are relevant for the postapartheid era. The first is that the process kept alive the idea that the rule of law was important.
In other words, the credibility of the courts, as contested a notion as it was, was important to
sustain the ideals of the common law.[37] It is worth noting that even black lawyers, most
sceptical of the legal system, and most disadvantaged by it professionally and personally, did not
jettison the idea of utilising the law to fight injustice.[38]
The second idea is a practical one: the infrastructure of the legal system and all its accoutrements
smoothed the way for the continuation of such an infrastructure; a not too insignificant factor in
as fragile and nascent a democracy as South Africa.
Obviously, those judges who took an appointment despite their liberal leanings felt that they had
room to manoeuvre and that the underpinnings of equity in the common law provided that space.
But the process of co-option, even at a slow pace, posed a real impediment to such a possibility.
And during the emergency period, the judges’ ability to vindicate the rights of political
opponents was sorely tested.[39]
Dyzenhaus states very stridently that more judges should have participated in the proceedings of
the TRC.[40] But this position may not be as straightforward as it appears. For the sitting judges,
as well as their retired colleagues, appearing before the TRC was a tricky business. The benefits
of multiple meae culpae, that is, many individual and group submissions, may have had a
salutary effect by adding to the perception that the judges who served during the apartheid years
wanted to apologise and therefore contribute to the process of reconciliation. And in the short
term, this may have been an overall good thing.
But there was a sentiment around that the downside of such an approach was considerable. South
Africa’s legal system had survived tremendous assaults on its credibility (assaults which were
justified), and could boast at the installation of the new Government not just an impressive
constitution and new constitutional court to enforce it, but a system of courts and a competent
judiciary. Nevertheless, the system was fragile at the core. A nervousness existed about the loss
of respect and credibility that may have accompanied large-scale judicial participation at the
TRC hearing; this apprehension was not insignificant.[41]
Moreover, the hearings were too short.[42] Even if a quarter of the judges who served under
apartheid made submissions with apologies, the time allocated to the hearings was not sufficient
to fairly address the complexities attendant on this question.[43]

Judge Chaskalson’s exhortation that little was to be gained from lamenting the past in the light of
all of this seemed perfectly reasonable. Dyzenhaus finds this proposition troubling, one that
vitiates the purpose of the TRC. He takes Judge Chaskalson to task for advocating what he terms
‘a politics of memory which opts for total or partial amnesia.’[44]
In the collision of memory and truth with certain unpalatable facts of legal history,
interpretations of the rule of law may become hostage. Dyzenhaus sees this as the core of Judge
Chaskalson’s ‘nothing to be gained from lamenting the past’ posture, one shared by a liberal
former Chief Justice, Judge Corbett, and other judges. In other words, Dyzenhaus wants the past
to be critically unbundled, with some limitations, in a way that implicates interpretations of the
rule of law as explicitly political:
Just as remembering the past will reveal the politics of the different understandings of the rule of
law, so a policy of forgetting the past (however noble its motivation) will obscure such politics,
perhaps permitting the bad old politics to exercise a hold on the future.[45]
Dyzenhaus unearths an old debate in South Africa, one sparked by a law professor, Raymond
Wacks, who argued in a lecture in 1983 that liberal judges ought to resign because they served to
legitimate a highly oppressive legal order.[46] His detractors were liberal academics who
believed that, even within the severe constraints of parliamentary sovereignty, the benefits
derived from judges remaining on the bench outweighed the possible benefits (the political and
moral statement) that may have flown from their resignation.[47] This debate, intense for a brief
period, fizzled out because Raymond Wacks’ call was not popularly supported, and in any event,
after a very short tenure at the University of Natal, he moved to the University of Hong
Kong.[48]
While Dyzenhaus agrees with Wacks that liberal judges add legitimacy to the legal system, he
does not think that calling for their resignation was good counsel. He disagrees with the premise
of Wacks’ position, namely that judges had no interpretive flexibility. At times judges could
provide a judgment, even with a statute clearly violating rights, that gave a victim some relief in
the courts.[49] Dyzenhaus also agrees that the resignation of liberal judges would impact
negatively on the future and the prospects of ensuring respect for the rule of law.
Dyzenhaus’ book is a thoughtful account of the legal hearings and the issues they raise. He deals
with the complexity of truth and memory, with contrasting interpretations of the past and their
articulation in contemporary South Africa. It is a difficult project, because that process of truth
and memory (and reconciliation) is still a work in progress, far from any resolution. In fact, there
really is no resolution: only questions raised and appropriate interpretations and responses given.
Dyzenhaus makes an excellent point about the role of the legal hearings in forcing the
connection between the ordinary and extraordinary violence of apartheid:
By examining together the administration of statutes which set out the programme of apartheid
and the statutes which set up the framework for suppressing opposition to apartheid, the Hearing
revealed the continuum between ordinary and extraordinary violence.[50]

The author’s major focus on the judges is not unproblematic. Judges were not the major legal
players during the apartheid era, although obviously they were not insignificant. Their tasks
included a review of all decisions from the lower courts. But they exist in a rather arcane world.
The interface of the brutalities of apartheid occurred for most black South Africans in the myriad
of lower courts, particularly the magistrates’ courts and the then Black Commissioner’s courts.
Of particular relevance were the horrors inflicted by the ubiquitous ‘pass courts’ which rendered
life frighteningly insecure for millions of Africans over the entire period of apartheid. The pass
courts enforced the system of influx control, a system which regulated the movement of Africans
in the most Kafkaesque manner, and arguably was the linchpin of apartheid.[51] Africans were
only allowed in the urban centres of South Africa to provide their labour, and permission was
only granted under the most stringent, and often arbitrary, conditions. This is where the majority
of South Africans experienced apartheid at its crudest and most cruel.[52]
The commissioners who adjudicated matters in the pass courts were mostly career civil servants
with the most rudimentary legal training. They were mostly Afrikaners and their ideology
coincided with that of the ruling National Party. It is not too implausible to say that they did not
wrestle with difficult moral and philosophical questions in their tasks. Judges, on the other hand
came from a more elite group of people. They were more educated, were almost overwhelmingly
drawn from the ranks of advocates and were not overwhelmingly Afrikaner.
Dyzenhaus recognises that his focus on judges may appear somewhat distorted, but argues that it
is ‘both inevitable and productive’, an argument he substantiates by referring to the work of
Robert Cover, an American law professor, and his impressive study of judges of the antebellum
period in the American South.[53] Cover’s work attempts to deconstruct the intrinsic relationship
between law and justice.[54] In other words, if one accepts that law embodies within it the ability
to achieve justice, then the adjudication of the law by judges is key to that analysis. And since
Judge Chaskalson and Archbishop Tutu adhere to that position, evaluating the role of judges at
the TRC hearings ‘provided a rare opportunity to reexamine the relationship between law and
justice.’[55]
The mechanics of stage-managing the process of truth and reconciliation are complicated and
difficult, especially as the process involves unfolding a shameful past and shaping the present
and the future. The legal system in South Africa, simultaneously hardy and vulnerable today, has
been at the centre of the transition. In fact, most commentators see the revolution there as largely
a legal one.[56] There is no doubt that since 1994, major institutional reforms of the legal system
have occurred, symbolised by the presence of the two most prominent jurists in the country,
Judge Chaskalson, President of the Constitutional Court, and Judge Mahomed, Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of Appeal. However, confronting the racism, sexism, arrogance and
indifference of the individual players who made the previous system workable and credible (if
only in the eyes of the beneficiaries) is a more challenging proposition.
Dyzenhaus thoughtfully and systematically argues why the legal hearings were so important in
confronting both the institutional underpinnings of the apartheid legal order, as well as individual
accountability for its excesses. And he laments the failure of judges, particularly liberal judges,
to adequately confront their roles in providing credibility to this system.[57] However, as a

mechanism, a process of countless written submissions and three days of testimony, the legal
hearings could not have adequately canvassed what ultimately would be necessary to exorcise
the legal system of its ignominious past.
Dyzenhaus’ strong objection to Judge Chaskalson’s ‘little to be gained from lamenting the past’
position is surprising.[58] If one sees the TRC as a product of a difficult process of negotiation
and compromise, then the central protagonists of the process, insiders in other words, may have a
greater sense of the possibilities of particular strategies. The TRC was about pursuing truth and
reconciliation, but it was ultimately a political compromise. Former Justice Minister Abdullah
Omar, chief architect of the TRC, noted that in creating the TRC, ‘we grappled with how to deal
with our past as part of a total constitutional and political settlement for our country’.[59]
Dyzenhaus has done an estimable task of narrating and analysing the TRC legal hearings. This
book is a valuable contribution to the continuous assessment both of the procedures and
substance of the TRC, and whether the purpose set out by its creators will in the long run be
fulfilled. The book also continues the perennial discussion of the relationship between law and
justice.
PENNY ANDREWS[*]
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